On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games (Q5931926): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 20:24, 19 March 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594693
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594693 |
Statements
On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games (English)
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25 September 2001
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The abstract model of a one-stage voting procedure introduced in \textit{R. B. Myerson} and \textit{R. J. Weber} [A theory of voting equilibria, Am. Political Sci. Rev. 87, 102-114 (1993)] is generalised. An analogy of \textit{J. C. Harsanyi}'s results [Int. J. Game Theory 2, 235-250 (1973; Zbl 0274.90085)] for generic (noncooperative) voting games under plurality rule the set of equilibria that induce a mixed distribution over the outcomes is finite and, furthermore, each of these equilibria is regular. From that the finiteness of the set of equilibrium distributions over outcomes is deduced.
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generic voting games
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noncooperative game
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plurality game
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