Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods. (Q1867532): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 21:46, 19 March 2024
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English | Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods. |
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Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods. (English)
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2 April 2003
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This paper is devoted to public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of the Euclidean space. Such type of economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of the reported preferences. The authors establish that any strategy-proof and strictly unanimous probabilistic mechanism has to be a random dictatorship. The random dictatorship from unanimity and strategy-proofness derives for the case of two agents. The \(n\)-agents result is derived by mathematical induction based on the two-agent result.
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public goods
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strategy- proofness
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probabilistic mechanism
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welfare loss
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