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Latest revision as of 14:37, 23 May 2024

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Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
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    Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (English)
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    28 May 1995
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    learning
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    perfect equilibria
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