Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (Q1814942): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 15:32, 24 May 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences |
scientific article |
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Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (English)
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1996
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single-peaked preferences
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constant scoring rule
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Condorcet winner criterion
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