Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities (Q1378022): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 09:42, 28 May 2024

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Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
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    Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities (English)
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    3 August 1998
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    no spillover noncooperative games
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    positive externality
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    pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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