Privately observed time horizons in repeated games (Q1593749): Difference between revisions

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+Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
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+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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+Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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+Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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+Sequential Equilibria
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+Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
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+Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information
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+Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known
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