Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model (Q5941342): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Bureaucracy, investment, and growth / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Public investment in infrastructure in a simple growth model / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Productive government expenditures and long-run growth / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
| Property / cites work | |||
| Property / cites work: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Revision as of 19:24, 3 June 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1635530
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1635530 |
Statements
Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model (English)
0 references
20 August 2001
0 references
rent-seeking bureaucracies
0 references
political authority
0 references
public services
0 references
growth rate
0 references
