When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? (Q1420512): Difference between revisions

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+An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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+Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model
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+Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
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+An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
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+Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination
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+Order independence for iterated weak dominance
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+Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
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+Q3332693
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+Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
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