Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. (Q1427493): Difference between revisions

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+Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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+A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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+Implementation in generalized matching problems
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+Games of manipulation in marriage problems
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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+On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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