Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667): Difference between revisions

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+Stable matchings with couples
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+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
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+Q4130997
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
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+NP-complete stable matching problems
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
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