When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts (Q1774815): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 10:58, 10 June 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers