Nash implementation via hyperfunctions (Q2432512): Difference between revisions

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+Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
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+The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
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+A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
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+Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
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+Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+A new approach to the implementation problem
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+Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
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+A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
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