Auctions in which losers set the price (Q2389310): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:34, 1 July 2024

scientific article
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English
Auctions in which losers set the price
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    Auctions in which losers set the price (English)
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    15 July 2009
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    auctions
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    second-price auction
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    English auction
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    \(k\)th price auction
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    affiliated values
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    rationing
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    robust mechanism design
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