Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing (Q969635): Difference between revisions

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+Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration
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+Normal rank
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+Location choices under quality uncertainty
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+Normal rank
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+On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
@@ Property / cites work: On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition" / rank @@
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+Welfare reducing licensing.
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+Normal rank
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+On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
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+Technology transfer with commitment.
@@ Property / cites work: Technology transfer with commitment. / rank @@
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+On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
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+General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
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+Fee versus royalty reconsidered
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+Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
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