Market structure and matching with contracts (Q1958951): Difference between revisions

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+A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+A strategic model of social and economic networks
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+Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
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+Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
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+Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+Q3999327
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+Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
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+Market structure and matching with contracts
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