Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule (Q430893): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:21, 5 July 2024

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Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
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    Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule (English)
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    26 June 2012
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    uniform rule
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    strategy-proofness for same tops
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    strategy-proofness
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    tops-only
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