On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050): Difference between revisions

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+Arrovian aggregation models
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+Normal rank
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+The threshold aggregation
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+Q4495209
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+The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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+On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
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+Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
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+Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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+Q3332693
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+A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
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+Q4196192
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+Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
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+Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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