Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598): Difference between revisions

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+Comparative statics in matching markets
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+The College Admissions Problem Revisited
@@ Property / cites work: The College Admissions Problem Revisited / rank @@
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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