Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot'' (Q2249577): Difference between revisions

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+Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
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+Q4836494
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+A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
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+Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
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+Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information
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+A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relationship between group size and helping
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+The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games
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