Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules (Q464615): Difference between revisions

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+Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+How hard is it to control an election?
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+Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
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+On the reconstruction of binary and permutation matrices under (binary) tomographic constraints
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+Algorithms and Computation
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+How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
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+A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
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+Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+On Representatives of Subsets
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+Analysis of Several Task-Scheduling Algorithms for a Model of Multiprogramming Computer Systems
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+Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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+Q3093654
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+Minimizing makespan in a two-machine flow shop with delays and unit-time operations is NP-hard
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+Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
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