Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals (Q2513286): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 14:46, 9 July 2024

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Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
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    Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals (English)
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    2 February 2015
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