Centralized allocation in multiple markets (Q898664): Difference between revisions

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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+Normal rank
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+Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
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+Normal rank
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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+Normal rank
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+School choice with neighbors
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+Normal rank
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+Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
+Normal rank
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
+Normal rank
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+Q4252038
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+Normal rank
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+The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
+Normal rank
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+On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
+Normal rank
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
+Normal rank
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+Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
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+Normal rank
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+Q4902563
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+Normal rank
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+Assignment problems with complementarities
@@ Property / cites work: Assignment problems with complementarities / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategyproof single unit award rules
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+Normal rank
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+Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
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+Q4120351
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank