Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability (Q900426): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 05:25, 11 July 2024

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Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
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    Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability (English)
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    22 December 2015
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    information rents
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    informed principal
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    mechanism design
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    moral hazard
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    signaling
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