Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model (Q2629509): Difference between revisions

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+Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
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+On the alternating use of ``unanimity'' and ``surjectivity'' in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Q5668220
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Further results on dictatorial domains
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+Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
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+Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
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+Circular domains
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+On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
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+A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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+Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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