Monotone strategyproofness (Q738926): Difference between revisions

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+Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
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+Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
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+When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
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+Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
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+On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
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+School choice: an experimental study
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
@@ Property / cites work: Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule / rank @@
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+Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
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+The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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