Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms? (Q318386): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture / rank
 
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Property / cites work: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:24, 12 July 2024

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Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms?
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    Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms? (English)
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    5 October 2016
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    ownership dynamics
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    managerial firms
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