A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders (Q2959828): Difference between revisions

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+An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
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+A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
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+The sample complexity of revenue maximization
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+The sample complexity of auctions with side information
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+Revenue maximization with a single sample
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+Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
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+Selling two goods optimally
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+Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
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+Making the Most of Your Samples
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+On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
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+On the Computational Complexity of Optimal Simple Mechanisms
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