Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case (Q5283446): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 04:48, 14 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6751266
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6751266

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    Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case (English)
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    21 July 2017
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    budget constraints
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    dictatorship
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    Pareto efficiency
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    incentive compatibility
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