Evaluationwise strategy-proofness (Q1682726): Difference between revisions

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+Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
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+Normal rank
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+Social threshold aggregations
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+A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
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+Q5392484
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+Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Voting by Committees
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+Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
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+Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
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+Q3430415
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+Q3626678
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+Gains from manipulating social choice rules
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+Manipulation and the Pareto rule
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation and the Pareto rule / rank @@
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+A general scoring rule
@@ Property / cites work: A general scoring rule / rank @@
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+Manipulation of social choice functions
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of social choice functions / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
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+Handbook on approval voting
@@ Property / cites work: Handbook on approval voting / rank @@
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+Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
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+An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
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+Further results on dictatorial domains
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+Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
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+Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice
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+Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Circular domains
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+A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
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+Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Approval voting on dichotomous preferences / rank @@
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+Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
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