Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828): Difference between revisions

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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+School choice under partial fairness
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+In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
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+Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
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+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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+Making just school assignments
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+Two simple variations of top trading cycles
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
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