Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results (Q1697842): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 04:18, 15 July 2024

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Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
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    Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results (English)
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    20 February 2018
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    resource allocation
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    bribe-proofness
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    single-peaked preference
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    domain maximality
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