Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted (Q1753304): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: Learning to accept in ultimatum games: Evidence from an experimental design that generates low offers / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining / rank | |||
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Revision as of 17:07, 15 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted |
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Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: beneficence cannot be extorted (English)
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29 May 2018
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ultimatum games
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voluntary play
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Adam Smith
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experimental economics
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