Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
@@ Property / cites work: When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Consistency in house allocation problems
@@ Property / cites work: Consistency in house allocation problems / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
@@ Property / cites work: School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup> / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Local and global consistency properties for student placement
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multilateral Bargaining
@@ Property / cites work: Multilateral Bargaining / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A market to implement the core
@@ Property / cites work: A market to implement the core / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
+Normal rank