Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:27, 19 July 2024

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Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
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    Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (English)
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    11 July 2019
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    uniform price auction
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    no monopoly
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    large market
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    \(\epsilon \)-Bayesian Nash equilibrium
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