Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070): Difference between revisions

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+Q4495209
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+Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
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+Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
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+Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
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+Optimal truncation in matching markets
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+Manipulability in school choice
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+Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study
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+Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Median stable matching for college admissions
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+Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
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+Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
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+On the Number of Fixed Pairs in a Random Instance of the Stable Marriage Problem
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
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+The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
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