Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties (Q2334139): Difference between revisions

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+Q2747613
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+Counting combinatorial choice rules
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+Efficient assignment respecting priorities
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+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Effective affirmative action in school choice
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+Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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