Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q776971): Difference between revisions

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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
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+Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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+A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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+TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
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+Stable matching with couples
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+Q3552447
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+The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
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+The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+Matching with aggregate externalities
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+Stability of marriage with externalities
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+Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
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+On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
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+Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
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+Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Q3999327
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Implementation in generalized matching problems
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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