Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard (Q5144775): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 08:24, 24 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7298129
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7298129

    Statements

    Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard (English)
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    19 January 2021
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    incentives
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    robust contract design
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    linear contracts
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    moral hazard
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    worst-case criterion
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    Identifiers