Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities (Q2668990): Difference between revisions

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+The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
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+Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
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+Implementability via protective equilibria
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+Protective behavior in matching models
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+Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions
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+On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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+The roommate problem with externalities
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+Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
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+Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
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+Nash implementation of matching rules
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+Implementation of college admission rules
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Implementation in generalized matching problems
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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