Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences (Q2140473): Difference between revisions

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+A further note on the stable matching problem
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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+Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
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+Q3995616
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+Q3138917
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+Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
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+On the Likely Number of Solutions for the Stable Marriage Problem
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+The Average Number of Stable Matchings
@@ Property / cites work: The Average Number of Stable Matchings / rank @@
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+On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
@@ Property / cites work: On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem / rank @@
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+On the Number of Fixed Pairs in a Random Instance of the Stable Marriage Problem
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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