Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games (Q1854736): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
Set OpenAlex properties.
 
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1021097716583 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1701922467 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 10:00, 30 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games
scientific article

    Statements

    Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    27 January 2003
    0 references
    This paper deals with discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. The scope and limitations of this class of games is discussed. The author provides a summary of the existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium for the infinite horizon game proved by \textit{L. O. Curtat} [Games Econ. Behav. 17, 177-199 (1996; Zbl 0874.90210)] and establishes the uniqueness of Markov equilibrium and dominance solvability results of the finite horizon game. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding value functions are nondecreasing Lipschitz-continuous functions of the state vector. Some specific economic applications are also discussed. Finally, an appendix summarizes the main definitions and results from lattice programming invoked in this paper.
    0 references
    discounted stochastic games
    0 references
    reward function
    0 references
    transition law
    0 references
    monotonicity
    0 references
    supermodularity
    0 references
    diagonal dominance
    0 references

    Identifiers