Informational hold up and intermediaries (Q6105131): Difference between revisions

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+Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
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+E-sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Noncompetitive Contracts
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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+Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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+Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
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+Price discrimination and efficient matching
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+Matching through position auctions
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+Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
@@ Property / cites work: Direct and Indirect Sale of Information / rank @@
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+Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
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+Intermediated Trade *
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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+The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
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+Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
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+Q4902563
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