Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games (Q639888): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 05:52, 9 December 2024

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Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games
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    Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games (English)
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    11 October 2011
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    The author introduces the notion of a weak better-reply security, which provides that each game satisfying it can be approximated by a well-behaved game (in the sense that a fixed point argument can be used to establish the existence of approximate equilibria) in such a way that limit points of approximate equilibria of the approximating game are themselves Nash equilibria of the original game. It is shown that every compact, quasiconcave game satisfying a weak better-reply security condition has a Nash equilibrium.
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    weak better-reply security
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    Nash equilibrium
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    fixed point
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    approximate equilibrium
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