Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies (Q338369): Difference between revisions

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replicator dynamics
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evolutionary game theory
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Nash equilibrium
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tit-for-tat
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generous tit-for-tat
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Revision as of 06:37, 28 June 2023

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English
Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies
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    Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies (English)
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    4 November 2016
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    replicator dynamics
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    evolutionary game theory
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    Nash equilibrium
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    tit-for-tat
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    generous tit-for-tat
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