Pages that link to "Item:Q3162725"
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The following pages link to School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup> (Q3162725):
Displayed 23 items.
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure (Q2338670) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with indifferences (Q2402065) (← links)
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences (Q2425160) (← links)
- What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets (Q2446689) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain (Q2453497) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints (Q2675446) (← links)
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences (Q4612470) (← links)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings (Q5095181) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach (Q6076902) (← links)
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS (Q6122165) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Stability of an allocation of objects (Q6156320) (← links)
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism (Q6168823) (← links)
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice (Q6176756) (← links)
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)