Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3989003
DOI10.2307/2297931zbMath0751.90013MaRDI QIDQ3989003
Publication date: 28 June 1992
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297931
91B50: General equilibrium theory
Related Items
Price competition for an informed buyer, Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies., When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?, Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination, On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games, Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium large markets with non-manipulable residual demand, Iterated elimination procedures, Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces, The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network