Multi-period bargaining: Asymmetric information and risk aversion

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00452-9zbMath0988.91029OpenAlexW2090504376MaRDI QIDQ5941400

Stanley S. Reynolds

Publication date: 20 August 2001

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00452-9

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (1)

Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor

Cites Work

• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• An Experimental Study of Buyer-Seller Negotiation with One-Sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting

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