Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2704zbMath0992.91010OpenAlexW2065008898MaRDI QIDQ5958894

David Wettstein, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date: 20 March 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/45235

zbMATH Keywords

coalition super-additive cover transferable utility environments weighted Shapley values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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