Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2016.02.002zbMath1354.91103OpenAlexW2280742990MaRDI QIDQ274410

Yosuke Yasuda, Yujiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Kurata, Masahiro Goto, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki

Publication date: 22 April 2016

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

market designdeferred acceptancestrategyproofnessmany-to-one-matchingmatching with constraintsmatching with contractstwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (15)

Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism ⋮ Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments ⋮ Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps ⋮ Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching ⋮ Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Stable fractional matchings ⋮ Envy-free matchings with lower quotas ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis ⋮ Envy-freeness and relaxed stability: hardness and approximation algorithms ⋮ Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy ⋮ Unnamed Item

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