Large shareholders, monitoring, and ownership dynamics: toward pure managerial firms?

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2012.10.006zbMath1346.91125OpenAlexW2099099892MaRDI QIDQ318386

Ngo Van Long, Amal Hilli, Didier Laussel

Publication date: 5 October 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

managerial firmsownership dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic games between firms and infinitely lived consumers: a review of the literature

Cites Work

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• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs
• Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm

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